AUDIT
Dissent Note of Shri.
D. K. Ranganekar, Member of Wanchoo
committee while recommending 44AB audit ( Source 155
ITR 81)
But, one Sri D.K. Rangnekar,
a member of the Committee, in his dissent (vide pp. 249 to 251) did not concur
with the recommendations of the Committee on compulsory audit for these
reasons:
“(2)
Reform of Audit System and Profession.—We have made in the main report a number
of proposals which visualise compulsory audit of
accounts on the assumption that audited accounts will assist the Income-tax
Department in making speedy assessments. In my view, the assumption is valid
only if the scope and nature of audit are also changed. Over the years auditors
have tended to certify financial statements without making a satisfactory audit
assessment or even without verifying the authenticity of accounts. One wonders
if black income would have proliferated the way it has if the auditing
profession had discharged its functions objectively and in keeping with the
high traditions of independent audit. Frequently, auditors have tended to
regard audit as merely a financial obligation to certify accounts which are
supposed to have been examined by them. And these are usually signed with a
qualification that absolves auditors of all responsibilities for certifying
financial jugglery, black-money manipulation, inventory and other
irregularities.
In
the manner in which the profession has developed, the role of the auditors has
obviously come under a cloud. Some auditors have set themselves up as management consultants, directors, businessmen, income-tax
experts (sic). They seem to do almost everything else other than
searching audit. There can be no doubt that when an auditor starts to sell
management and ‘other’ advice and offers various unspecified services, he
immediately compromises his objectivity. Virtually one ends up with a situation
where the company that has purchased the ‘services’ of the auditors in various
forms follows the recommendations of its own auditor consultant leaving little
else for ‘audit’. In some cases at least it would mean that the auditors
concerned are being asked to pass on their own firms ‘other work’. And these
instances are by no means small. A study of 501 companies showed that payments
to auditors for services other than auditing were is high as 60 to 65 per cent.
of the total payment made to the auditors by these
companies. There are also cases where travelling and
other allowances (which are usually reserved for salaried employees) are paid
to auditors.
Difficulties
arise because the precise role of the auditor has not been defined. The Company
Law is vague on this subject, and there is very little in the existing legal
framework to safeguard either the independence of the auditor or the interest
of the shareholders, the public and the exchequer. The independence of the
auditor is essential also for the orderly development of trade and industry. It
is not enough for the auditor or his institute or council to claim independence
on behalf of the profession.
Even
for purposes of income-tax assessment or rectitude of business and high
standards of management, it is important that the public is told about the
correctness of inventory valuation, of depreciation provisions and other
important matters of business and profession. The multi-relationship developed
by the auditors with their clients ends to dim the strictly professional role
of auditors and their independence.
Against
this background, I thought I might put forward the following proposals. These I
consider are significant in the battle against the evil of black income. In
order to ensure the evolution of an independent audit system, the economic
dependence of auditors upon a certain small group of clients should also be
broken.
(i) Auditors should not be allowed to render any
service other than the professional service of auditing. Those auditors who
prefer to render `other services’ should not be allowed to take up audit work.
The idea is to develop a corps of audit firms exclusively doing audit work on
the lines of specialised legal and medical services.
(ii)
No auditor should be allowed any position on the board of directors of any
company so long as he continues to be a professional auditor. Any auditor who
prefers to be a director of a company or engage himself in tax consultancy
work, system, design or any other similar work should be debarred from audit
work.
(iii)
Any complaint on the accuracy of audit made by 10 per cent. of
the shareholders (present and voting at a general body meeting) should be
compulsorily followed up by an independent investigation.
(iv) In order to reduce concentration of audit business among
selected firms, a system of rotation should be followed whereby no audit firm
is allowed to audit the accounts of the same client for more than three years.
(v)
As general rule, a supervisory audit should be undertaken every three years by
an audit firm other than the one contractually employed as auditor of a
particular company. The supervisory audit should be done by an auditor
nominated by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of
(vi) The Company Law should be amended to define the
role of the auditor and to set up a Private Accounts Committee. This committee
should comprise of independent economic, technical management and accountancy
experts and should assist the Comptroller and Auditor-General to ensure that
high standards are maintained in supervisory audit and also to act as a
watch-dog of business operations involving an annual turnover of Rs. 1 crore and above.”